|Series||Special report -- no. 163|
|Contributions||United States. Dept. of State. Bureau of Public Affairs|
|The Physical Object|
|Pagination||6 p. ;|
Additional Physical Format: Online version: Soviet noncompliance with arms control agreements. Washington, DC: U.S. Dept. of State, Bureau of Public Affairs, Get this from a library! Soviet noncompliance with arms control agreements: February 1, [Ronald Reagan; United States. President ( Reagan); United States. Department of State. Office of Public Communication. Editorial Division.]. Get this from a library! Soviet noncompliance with arms control agreements: December [Ronald Reagan; United States. President ( Reagan); United States. Department of State. Bureau of Public Affairs.]. SOVIET NONCOMPLIANCE WITH ARMS CONTROL AGREEMENTS INTRODUCTION In January , the President, in response to Congressional requests, reported to the Con-gress on several issues involving violations or probable violations by the Soviet Union of ex-isting arms control agreements, including: the Geneva Protocol on Chemical Weapons, the.
Third, last week, my office at the State Department published a paper looking back at the history of the U.S. Compliance Report process and bringing together — for the first time, as far as I am aware — an account of how U.S. officials have assessed Soviet and Russian compliance with arms control agreements throughout the three and a half. Soviet noncompliance. Second, the U.S. believes that equitable arms re duction agreements with provisions that are effec tively verifiable will, if complied with, enhance sta bility and security. New arms control agreements, if soundly formulated and adhered to, can serve U.S. interests. We should not abandon efforts to achieve. Statement on Soviet and United States Compliance With Arms Control Agreements. On the eve of the strategic arms reductions talks (START) in , I decided that the United States would not undercut the expired SALT I Interim Offensive Agreement or the unratified SALT II agreement as long as the Soviet Union exercised equal restraint. Even as President Ronald Reagan and Soviet Premier Mikhail Gorbachev continued with negotiations, President Reagan reported to Congress that the Soviets were cheating on existing agreements, raising security concerns and casting a shadow over the entire arms control process.
Soviet Noncompliance with Arms Control Agreements The following is the text of a message to the Congresstransmitting the President's Report on Soviet Noncompliance with.-Arms Control Agreements as required by the FY Arms Control and . Soviet Noncompliance with Arms Control Agreements, 3. START Treaty Between the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on the Reduction and Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms Signed in Moscow J , , – Adherence to and Compliance with Arms Control Agreements, Soviet Noncompliance with Arms Control Agreements on Janu n If the concept of arms control is to have meaning I said, , and credibility as a contribution to global or regional stability, it is essential that all parties to agreements comply with them." I continue to believe that compliance with arms control agreements. Begun in November , by May , the Strategic Arms Limitation Talks (SALT) had produced both the Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM) Treaty, which limited strategic missile defenses to (later ) interceptors each, and the Interim Agreement, an executive agreement that capped U.S. and Soviet intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBM) and.